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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
 
As well as incorporating and exploring the role of formal analytical methods as a means of highlighting and                  
discovering foundational and fundamental strategy issues, such as the determinants/causes of performance            
differences between banking institutions and other corporate structures across various jurisdictions, this paper             
aims to contribute to the literature on how limitations of empirical based research can be mitigated. 
 
 
Such causes of performance differences will incorporate a consideration of what these determinants are, how               
they operate, how performance should be measured, the extent to which such differences persist, the extent to                 
which such performance measures should be relied upon. Performance measures to be incorporated in this               
paper will focus primarily on firm performance measures, such as leverage ratios, as well as a brief discussion                  
of macro-economic indicators. From this perspective, the rise of macroeconomics, micro economic            
inefficiency debates - as well as the validity of such debates will be considered. 
 
 
In its aim to accentuate why many doubts have arisen as regards the reliability of the Basel III Leverage Ratio                    
as a performance measure, and principally in respect of calibration issues, this paper will also provide an                 
analysis of the recent updates which have taken place in respect of the Basel III Leverage Ratio and the Basel                    
III Supplementary Leverage Ratio – both in respect of recent amendments introduced by the Basel Committee                
and proposals introduced in several jurisdictions such as the United Kingdom and the United States.  
 
The paper will also aim to highlight the role of enforcement and the enforceability of rules, ratios and standards,                   
in ensuring that more comparable, consistent, objective and ultimately reliable performance measures are             
generated. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Basel III, Capital Requirements Directive IV, leverage ratios, enforcement, supervision, Binding Technical            
Standards, Keynesian revolution, macroeconomics, micro economic inefficiency 
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Enhancing the Reliability of Performance Measures in Empirical Based 
Research: Leverage Ratios and Theoretical Based Research 
 
Marianne Ojo  1
 
 
A. Introduction 
 
How Does the Enforceability of Rules Enhance the Reliability of Performance Measures? 
 
According to the European Banking Authority (EBA), “the overarching goal of the Basel III agreement and its                 
implementing Act, the CRD IV package, is:  2
 
- to strengthen the resilience of the EU banking sector so that it would be better placed to absorb                  
economic shocks whilst ensuring that banks continue to finance economic activity and growth.” 
 
 
The CRD IV package, which was introduced in 2013, replaces the Directives 2006/48 and 2006/49, with a                 
Directive and Regulation. The CRD IV entered into force on 1 January 2014 - with some phasing in                  3
arrangements taking place between 2014 and 2019. 
 
The first consultative paper on a new capital adequacy framework, which was issued by the Basel Committee                 
on Banking Supervision, introduced the „three pillar“ model which encompasses the minimum capital             
requirements, supervisory review and market discipline - „as a lever to strengthen disclosure and encourage               
safe and sound banking practices.“ ​As well as the criticism related to the fact that it rewarded risk lending, the                    4
fact that „capital requirements were just reasonably related to banks’ risk taking activities and that the credit                 
exposure requirement was the same regardless of the credit rating of the borrower,“ ​a general criticism of                 5
Basel I relates to the fact that it promoted capital arbitrage. Such capital arbitrage being attributed to its wide                   
risk categories which provided banks with the liberty to „arbitrage between their economic assessment of risk                
and the regulatory capital requirements.”  6
1 Professor, Faculty of Commerce and Administration, North West University Email: marianneojo@hotmail.com 
2 European Banking Authority, Implementing Basel III Europe: CRD IV Package  
http://www.eba.europa.eu/regulation-and-policy/implementing-basel-iii-europe  
 
3 “The Regulation, the CRR, contains detailed prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms whilst the                 
new Directive covers areas of the current Capital Requirements Directive where EU provisions need to be transposed by                  
Member States in a way suitable to their respective environment.” see ibid 
4 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 'Consultative Paper on a New Capital Adequacy Framework' 3rd June 1999 
http://www.bis.org/press/p990603.htm> 
 
5 See M Saidenberg and T Schuermann, 'The New Basel Capital Accord and Questions for Research' (2003) Wharton 
Financial Institutions Center Working Paper 2003 at page 4 
 
6 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 'Capital Requirements and Bank Behaviour: The Impact of the Basel Accord'  
3 
„Regulatory capital arbitrage“, a practice which involves banks „using securitisation to alter the profile of their                
book“ usually produces the effect of making bank's capital ratios appear inflated. Four identified types of                7
capital arbitrage are:   ​cherry picking, securitisation with partial recourse, remote origination and indirect credit. 8
 
The Second Consultative Paper, issued by the Basel Committee in January 2001, introduced the two Internal                
Ratings Based (IRB) methodologies – the Foundational IRB and the Advanced IRB methodologies. The              
Internal Ratings Based approach to capital requirements for credit risk, not only relies significantly on the                
internal assessment carried out by a bank, in relation to counterparties and exposures, but is also geared                 
towards the achievement of two primary goals, namely: ​„additional risk sensitivity“ and „incentive             9
compatibility“. 
 
Basel 2 is premised on a three level approach which permits banks to select from three models, namely: the                   
basic standardized model, the IRB foundation approach and the advanced ratings approach. According to the               
Consultative Document on Standard Approach to Credit Risk, ​capital requirements under the standardized             10
approach are considered to be more synchronised and in harmony with the principal elements of banking risk                 
– owing to the introduction of more differentiated risk weights and a broader recognition of techniques which                 
are applied in mitigating risk whilst such techniques attempt to avoid undue complexity. As a result, capital                 
ratios generated through the standardized approach, should adapt more to present and actual risks              
encountered by banks, than was the case previously. 
 
 
Under Pillar One minimum capital requirements, operational risk is to be corroborated by capital.              
Measurement approaches for operational risk can be found in the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD) and               
there are three broad approaches to the capital assessment of operational risk which are as follows: 
 
- Basic Indicator Approaches 
- Standardized Approaches 
- Internal Measurement Approach 
 
The developments and evolution across the Basel Capital Accords have illustrated their focus to address               
prevailing financial risks at the time, their focus on the regulation of complex financial instruments such as hedge                  
funds, the pro cyclical nature of risks and the need to mitigate occurrences related to regulatory capital                 
arbitrage. The era of Basel III has also witnessed the introduction of liquidity standards – these being the first                   
of their kind, However the need to address off balance sheet instruments, complex derivative products,               
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision Working Papers April 1999 at page 21 
 
7 See ibid; Bank's capital ratio may appear inflated „relative to the riskiness of the remaining exposure“ see ibid 
8 Ibid at pages 22-24 
9 In establishing an Internal Ratings Based approach, the Committee's intention was directed at „fine tuning capital  
requirements with a greater degree of accuracy to the level of a bank's exposure to credit risks.“ Basel Committee on  
Banking Supervision, 'The Internal Ratings Based Approach' Supporting Document to the New Basel Capital Accord 2001  
at pages 1 and 3 http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsca05.pdf 
 
10  Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Consultative Document, Standard Approach to Credit Risk, Supporting  
Document to the New Basel Accord January 2001 at page 1 http;//www.bis.org/publ/bcbsca04.pdf 
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exposures of various kinds – and particularly those exposures relating to derivatives, off balance sheet and                
leverage, as well as those risks attributed to non-bank institutions, continually constitute a vital focal point. 
 
The Capital Requirements Directive (CRD) IV, which constitutes the Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR),             
as well as the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD), is aimed at implementing Basel III in the European                 
Union. Consequently, this CRD package, replaces Directives 2006/48 and 2006/49 with a Regulation and a               
Directive. The significance of such a move not only highlights the awareness of the importance of ensuring that                  
Basel rules and regulations become more binding and enforceable, but also signals an era whereby the use of                  
enforcement and supervisory tools such as Binding Technical Standards (BTS) are being introduced and              
generated by the European Banking Authority, as its plays a crucial role in the implementation of Basel III in                   
the EU. 
 
Another significance of such a move towards Basel rules and regulations becoming more enforceable and               
binding lies in the facilitation of greater consistency, convergence and compliance, which the introduction of a                
Regulation, Binding Technical Standards, as well as other reporting requirements and provisions would             
generate in the implementation process. The increased relevance of Basel rules, and particularly Basel III rules,                
as well as their significance for the Eurozone, European Union institutions and European banks is hereby                
emphasised. 
 
 
This paper is structured as follows: As well as highlighting the relationship between Basel III and the Capital                  
Requirements Directive IV, section B, the literature review section, proposes a means of mitigating the gaps                
which exist in the current and previous literature on the topic of leverage ratios. Further, section C consolidates                  
on the importance of incorporating the conceptual and theoretical based frameworks, theories, and particularly              
micro economic theories in the design and methodology of empirical based research. 
 
Efforts aimed at improving the performance measure attributes of the leverage ratio will be analysed under                
section C. This will be facilitated through a consideration of the progress and initiatives aimed at reducing the                  
potential for regulatory capital arbitrage practices, as well as further more vital reasons attributable to the need                 
for enhanced supplementary leverage ratios, namely, the need for adequate calibration between the risk based               
capital framework and the leverage ratio framework, as well as the need to avoid scenarios which could result                  
in the undercapitalisation of banking institutions. 
 
As well as emphasising the all-important need to achieve a balance between the need for consistency,                
comparability and improved harmonisation whilst ensuring that simplicity and a „one size fits all“ approach does                
not promote a situation whereby credible and accurate results are neglected at the expense of achieving a                 
standardized approach, the concluding section enlightens on how the leverage ratio, as a performance              
measure, should be approached - having due considerations to the need for calibration with the risk based                 
capital adequacy framework, as well as the incorporation of thorough and frequent disclosure practices. 
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B Literature Review 
 
Accounting For the Gaps in the Literature on Leverage Ratios 
 
Since leverage ratios constitute the focal point of this study and given the fact that insufficient data is available                   
and also the fact that ​less empirical evidence exists to bolster various related claims - since the Basel leverage                   
ratio was only just recently introduced in 2010​, ​in comparison to the capital adequacy framework, the                
conceptual and theoretical frameworks will constitute the dominant features in this aspect of the study.  
 
As well as lessons drawn from the most recent financial crisis, namely, how quickly a capital crisis could                  
transform into a liquidity crises, the need for leverage ratios also came to light: 
 
- ​An underlying feature of the financial crisis was the build-up of excessive on- and off-balance sheet                 
leverage in the banking system. In many cases, banks built up excessive leverage while maintaining               
strong risk-based capital ratios. At the height of the crisis, the market forced the banking sector to                 
reduce its leverage in a manner that amplified downward pressure on asset prices. This deleveraging               
process exacerbated the feedback loop between losses, falling bank capital, and shrinking credit             
availability​.  11
 
The Basel III reforms introduced a „simple, transparent, non-risk based leverage ratio which is intended to                
serve – not only as a „credible supplementary measure to the risk-based capital requirements“ but also:  12
 
• restrict the build-up of leverage in the banking sector to avoid destabilising deleveraging processes that can                 
damage the broader financial system and the economy; and 
• reinforce the risk-based requirements with a simple, non-risk-based “backstop” measure. 
 
Furthermore, the Basel Committee is of the view that:  13
 
• a simple leverage ratio framework is critical and complementary to the risk-based capital framework; and 
• a credible leverage ratio is one that ensures broad and adequate capture of both the on- and off-balance                   
sheet leverage of banks. 
 
The importance of liquidity risks, which also contributed to the devastating effects of the recent Financial                
Crisis, also resulted in the introduction of two liquidity standards, namely, the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR),                
and the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR).  
 
 
The definition of liquidity, as provided by the Bank of International Settlements (BIS), is “the ability of a bank                   
to fund increases in assets and meet obligations as they come due, without incurring unacceptable losses. The                 
fundamental role of banks in the maturity transformation of short-term deposits into long-term loans makes               
11 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Consultative Document Revised Basel III Leverage Ratio Framework and  
Disclosure Requirements June 2013 at page 4 of 22 http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs251.pdf 
 
12 ibid 
13 ibid 
6 
banks inherently vulnerable to liquidity risk, both of an institution-specific nature and that which affects markets                
as a whole.”  14
 
A liquidity crisis is considered to be „the classic type of banking crisis whereby a bank for some reason,                   
cannot meet all its payment obligations.“ The role played by imperfect knowledge in triggering such a crisis is                  15
further elaborated. In this sense, bank runs are triggered as a result of such „imperfect knowledge which                 
customers have of their banks, and the links through the interbank market and payment system.“ Such role                 16
played by imperfect knowledge or information asymmetries in triggering such crises could also be extended to                
enterprises, firms and organisations - and not just banking organisations. 
 
Whilst the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR)'s objective is aimed at „promoting the short-term resilience of the                
liquidity risk profile of banks by ensuring that banks have an adequate stock of unencumbered high quality                 
assets (HQLA) that can be converted easily and immediately into cash“ to meet the liquidity needs of private                  
markets for a 30 calendar day liquidity stress scenario, the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) is targeted at                  
medium to longer term funding activities of banking institutions. By the very nature of the definition of these                  
liquidity standards, the first to be introduced under Basel III, it is not difficult to comprehend why the Liquidity                   
Coverage Ratio constitutes the more crucial standard. 
 
The NSFR serves as a complementary standard to the LCR in serving to „limit over-reliance on short-term                 
wholesale funding during times of buoyant market liquidity and encourage better assessment of liquidity risk               
across all on- and off-balance sheet items“ as well as a „minimum enforcement mechanism.“ 
 
As is the case with the two liquidity standards which are intended to serve as complementary measures to the                   
risk-based capital adequacy framework, the Basel III Leverage Ratio was established by the Basel Committee               
as a non-risk based measure which is intended to serve as a supplement to the Basel risk based capital                   
framework. The merits of the Leverage Ratio as a supplement to the risk based capital adequacy framework                 
include: ​i) Its constraint of the build-up of leverage in the banking sector – which the risk based regime is not                     17
equipped to address; ii) Through a non-risk based „backstop“ which ultimately serves to protect against model                
risk, and the reduction of capital requirements, its reinforcement of risk based requirements; iii) Its role as a                  
standardized measure that investors and counterparties can use in making comparisons between banks over a               
period of time; iv) The establishment by certain academics that the leverage ratio is a „statistically significant“                 
predictor of potential bank failures. 
 
Hence it can be illustrated that the Basel III Leverage ratio not only serves as a supplementary measure to the                    
risk based capital adequacy framework, but also a means whereby the facilitation of greater comparability               
between banks can be achieved (since standardization promotes consistency, enhanced transparency and            
disclosure). It vital role as a supplementary tool to the risk based capital adequacy framework in countering                 
risk taking incentives is hence illustrated. 
14   Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk Management and Supervision Sept 2008 at page 1 
<http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs144.htm> 
15 See RM Lastra and G Wood, „The Crisis of 2007 – 09: Nature, Causes and Reactions“ Journal of International 
Economic Law 13(3) at pages 531 and 532 
16  ibid 
17 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Discussion Paper 'The Regulatory Framework: Balancing Risk 
Sensitivity, Simplicity and Comparability“ July 2013 Bank for International Settlements Publications at page 16 
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BII The Relationship Between Basel III and the Capital Requirements Directive IV 
 
The legislative package for the CRD IV was adopted by the European Parliament and the EU Commission in                  
April 2013, with the CRD IV changes being grouped into two areas:  18
 
- capital reform 
- liquidity standards 
 
“The enhanced Basel II Framework (which includes reforms aimed at increasing the quantity of capital - as                 
well as improving the quality of capital), and the macroprudential overlay (together), are referred to as Basel                 
III.” 
 
Under Basel II, the Tier One Capital ratio which banks were required to retain was 4%. Under Basel III, this                    
has been raised to 6%. 
 
Further, whilst Basel II stipulated a Core Tier One capital ratio of 2%, this has been increased to 4.5% under                    
Basel III and comprises of common equity before deductions. 
 
In respect of the capital conservation buffer, Basel III regulations require that banks retain a capital                
conservation buffer of 2.5% - bringing total common equity requirements to 7%. 
 
In respect of the countercyclical buffer, Basel III regulations stipulate a requirement within a range of 0% and                  
2.5% of “common equity or other fully absorbing capital” to be implemented according to national               
circumstances. 
 
Both the capital conservation and counter cyclical buffers did not exist under Basel II. 
 
Under Basel III, additional capital requirements have also been stipulated for systemically relevant financial              
institutions. 
 
The CRD IV is also aimed at:  19
 
- Increasing the quality of eligible capital 
- Increasing the quantity of capital held by establishing significantly higher minimum capital ratios and              
reducing pro cyclicality through the introduction of the new capital buffers 
- Increasing the capital requirements for Counterparty Credit Risk - including a new capital charge for               
potential mark-to-market losses on OTC derivatives 
- Introduction of a non risk based leverage ratio to safeguard build-up of leverage in the system  
 
18 See KPMG, “CRD IV: Single Rule Book for EU Banking Regulation Changes and Implications” May 2013  
19  see ibid 
8 
Key CRD IV provisions in relation to increased quality of capital, include the following:  20
 
- Common equity Tier One becomes the primary measure of capital adequacy 
- Basel II deductions are applied in full to common equity Tier One rather than 50:50 
- Exclusion of hybrid instruments from common equity Tier One (with stricter criteria for inclusion of               
instruments in additional Tier One) 
- Harmonised and stricter requirements for Tier 2 
- Tier 3 capital no longer eligible  
 
 
 
Key CRD IV provisions in relation to increased quantity of capital, include the following:  21
 
- Minimum common equity Tier One ratio of 4.5% (excluding buffers) 
- Minimum Tier One ratio of 6% (excluding buffers) 
- Minimum total capital of 8% (excluding buffers) 
- Introduction of three capital buffers: namely, the capital conservation buffer, counter-cyclical buffer and             
the systemic buffer 
 
The significance of the CRD IV in implementing Basel III lies in the fact that Basel III will become more                    
directly binding and enforceable in EU member states. This differs significantly from the previous situation with                
Basel II, not just because two directives (Directives 2006/48 and 2006/49), existed then, but because of the                 
European Banking Authority’s new mandate (as will be illustrated in the conclusive section of this paper), in                 
generating Binding Technical Standards (BTS). BTS are to be adopted by the European Commission by               
means of Regulations or Decisions - regulations being binding and directly applicable in member states,               
according to EU Law. 
 
 
 
BIII Theoretical and Empirical Based Research: Which is More Important? 
 
“Scholars must do more to develop explicit theoretical arguments and ensure that their methods match their                
underlying assumptions about causality ontology and epistemology.”  22
 
Theories therefore, constitute the backbone and framework on which successful empirical based research is              
generated. 
 
Conversely, Mitchell argues that: 
 
20 ibid 
21 ibid 
22  AR Poteete, M Janssen and E Ostrom ​Working Together: Collective Action, the Commons and Multiple Methods in 
Practice​  2010 Princeton University Press at page 14 
9 
- Legal theory and policy should be informed by sound empirical research - but that the limits of an                  
empirical approach should be acknowledged and addressed.  23
 
Mitchell is also highlighted as consolidating on the argument that “behavioural law and economics should be                
focussed on seeking solutions to specific problems rather than attempting to formulate a general model of                
behaviour to compete with law and economies rational actor model.”  24
 
However, this is precisely the criticism that has arisen in relation to the application of empirical based research.                  
How applicable are their results to similar future occurrences? If such results cannot be applied generally, then                 
to what extent should they be relied upon to accurately predict future occurrences? 
 
His argument for the response to individual specific and unique incidences is however more convincing: 
 
- If Enron is an aberration or the product of unique forces unlikely to be seen again, then why bother                   
with sweeping legal reforms and why not focus on criminal punishment, civil liability and reparations for                
the players in the Enron case alone?” 
 
His remarks could also be addressed if a generally applicable solution to past, present and future crises could                  
be found. Then this would justify the major and “sweeping legal reforms” as well as costs, time and efforts                   
undertaken to ensure that such past failures are avoided in the future. Whilst it is technically and physically not                   
feasible to derive a solution for every unique and specific occurrence, owing to time and costs involved, a                  
generally applicable solution, better provided by theories, in dealing with root causes of the issues at hand,                 
would serve as a benchmark whereby future crises resulting from similar past errors or failures, could be                 
averted.  
 
D’Ippolito argues that ”a unified body of knowledge and theory about designing and design has not yet                 
emerged” and in so doing makes reference to Love who argues that it would generate adverse                25
consequences, namely: theoretical conflicts between researchers especially those working in different domains;            
difficulties in validating theories against their ontological, epistemological and theoretical contexts, a lack of              
clarity about the scope, bounds and foci of fields of research and theory - making about designing and designs. 
 
Poteete et al also add that the latest techniques are sometimes adopted with little reference to theoretical                 26
considerations or understanding of the underlying assumptions - and that however, methodological            
sophistication cannot substitute for theory. In so doing, reference is also made to Achen who warns that                 27
“quantitative analyses which are not supported by theoretical micro foundation considerations or careful             
exploration of the data”, would generate unreliable results which can not be trusted. 
 
23 See G Mitchell, “The Promise and Limitations of An Empirical Approach to Law” at page 29 
24 see ibid at page 32 
25 Love (2002); See B D’Ippolito “An Exploratory Review of the Design Literature: Gaps and Avenues For Future Research” 
June 2012 Manchester Business School Working Paper, Number 628, available: 
http://www.mbs.ac.uk/cgi/apps/research/working-papers/​ at page 7  
26 AR Poteete, M Janssen and E Ostrom ​Working Together: Collective Action, the Commons and Multiple Methods in 
Practice​  2010 Princeton University Press at page 12 
27 (2002,2005) see ibid 
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Emphasis is also directed at the fact that “design science, along with natural science, are important to ensure                  
that research on information technologies, is both relevant and effective.” Furthermore, products of design              28
science are considered to be four types, namely:  29
 
- constructs 
- models 
- methods; and 
- implementation 
 
The above is also applicable to other fields of discipline - and particularly the social sciences where the                  
structure of the design, as well as model specification of the variables to be incorporated into the study, are                   
crucial to the success and implementation of the design. 
 
 
C Theoretical Considerations: Methodology and the Design of the Study 
 
Limitations of Empirical Based Research 
 
In order for empirical based research to generate meaningful and credible results, a theoretical framework               
which serves not just as complement, but which also constitutes the backbone of the research is essential. For                  
this reason, a review of the literature to which contribution of knowledge is to be made, should ideally,                  
comprise of three sections, namely the conceptual framework, the theoretical framework and the empirical              
framework. 
 
As a result, empirical based research is limited severely in its reasoning and arguments where an absence of a                   
theoretical based framework for the study, which constitutes the focal point of investigation, exists. Whether a                
theoretical based research provides more credibility than an empirical based one, has constituted the focus of                
many contentious debates. One common theme resonating however from these debates, relates to the vital role                
of theories in explaining “causality effects” of the research problem being addressed. And whilst more               
credibility would be generated where a theoretical based research is consolidated with empirical based              
investigations, the results of an empirical based research cannot be applied as generally, in addressing the                
cause of the problem - but rather, has more individual and duration specific based application. 
 
Empirical based research, for this reason, is limited by time lagged factors, the incorporation of specific and                 
relevant variables, which may or may not be relevant to and at, a specific or particular period. Further, the                   
design of empirical based research which not only incorporates the model specification (which should              
constitute the framework of the empirical aspect of the study), but also the methodology to be used, is of vital                    
and crucial importance. 
 
 
28 March and Smith (1995); see B D’Ippolito “An Exploratory Review of the Design Literature: Gaps and Avenues For Future 
Research” June 2012 at page 8 
29 see ibid 
11 
As well as design and methodology also being considered to be a means of attaining and performing goal                  
oriented activities. a further, the major function of design is considered to be “the creation of models, methods                  
and implementations  which are innovative and valuable”.  30
 
 
 
The theoretical based framework should influence the design of the empirical study to be undertaken 
 
Empirical study 
 
Stage One: Model specification - which determines the inputs, namely the variables (dependent and              
independent variables) to be incorporated 
 
Stage Two: Methodology - which involves the implementation of the design which incorporates the              
inputs/variables to be used in the study 
 
Stage Three: Generating the results and products after having implemented the design 
 
Stage Four: Interpreting the results of the investigation 
 
Stage One ----------------> Stage Four represents the decreasing order of importance since the success of               
the outcome of the investigation is wholly and entirely dependent on stage one - even though other stages are                   
also still important. 
 
Hence the significance of theories and their role in contributing to the success of empirical based research.  
 
 
 
CII Growing Importance of Macro Economic Perspectives  
 
“Taming the Tiger of Banking and Finance”: Dealing with the Root Causes  
 
“First and foremost, this is a crisis of economics and particularly of conventional macroeconomics. The               
discussion of the shocks……. demonstrates quite clearly that the waves of huge crises which hit the                
high-income economies was not a result of events outside the economic system, such as an unexpected war or                  
a vast natural disaster…….. 
 
Secondly, this has been a crisis of the financial system. Naturally and inevitably, efforts have been made to                  
tighten up regulation and improve the resilience of the system. These efforts are not insignificant. But in                 
30 B D’Ippolito “An Exploratory Review of the Design Literature: Gaps and Avenues For Future Research” June 2012 at page 
8 
 
12 
essence, they are conservative: an attempt to preserve the essence of a system that we already know is                  
extremely fragile……..”  31
 
As illustrated under the literature review section, the devastating effects of liquidity risks, as well as excessive                 
deleveraging processes, contributed to the introduction of liquidity standards, as well as the leverage ratio,               
under Basel III reforms. 
 
Whilst it cannot be disputed that considerable efforts are being undertaken to deal with root causes of the most                   
recent Crisis, through the introduction of these liquidity standards and the leverage ratio, a greater concern                
relates to the Basel III leverage ratio. The ensuing section, section D, will elaborate on these concerns - which                   
principally revolve round its effectiveness as a performance measure. Another concern relates to the macro               
economic perspective of addressing the Crisis which has increasingly been accredited with greater focus. From               
these perspectives it could be questioned whether the root causes of the recent Crisis are being effectively                 
dealt with or whether such problems are only being aggravated as a result of the introduction of the Basel                   
leverage ratio or an increasingly macroeconomic based inclination. 
 
In his article, Boettke illustrates how “new economics of Keynes moved away from the methodological               32
individualist position and questioned the self regulatory robustness of the market economy.” He further adds               
that instead of reliance on market forces to self- correct for errors in investment, the government was given the                   
policy role of correcting for market instability and that in addition to this Keynesian revolution in macro                 
economics, economists started to develop arguments about the micro economic efficiency of the market              
economy - with theories of imperfect competition and monopolistic competition being developed during the              
1930s. 
 
The shortcomings of macro economics, the reliability of macro economic indicators have been brought to light                
following the recent Financial Crisis. Furthermore, the extent of government intervention in regulation is very               
evident as revealed through the G20 gathering of member states which promulgated the introduction of Basel                
III measures. To what extent should judiciary, legislature or the executive intervene in regulatory standard               
setting? Will the Basel III’s more macro economic focus resolve issues which are attributed to monetary and                 
fiscal shortcomings? From this perspective, those discussions relating to monetary policy, which have             
considered problems of addressing challenges presented by inflexible wages are also relevant. This is also               
relevant to the present crises encountered by the Eurozone in respect of German wage flexibility and lack of                  
competitiveness in the rest of the Eurozone.  33
 
Even though micro economic theory has lost much of its relevance over the years, as rightly highlighted, 
  
- the analysis of fine details of the economy’s structure, can teach one to understand such vital issues as                  
the role of competition.”  34
31 See prologue, M Wolf, ​The Shifts and the Shocks: What We’ve Learned - and Have Still to Learn” ​2014 Penguin Press                      
New York 
32  See P Boettke, “Information and Knowledge: Austrian Economics in Search of Its Uniqueness” The Review of Austrian 
Economics, 15:4, 263–274, 2002  Kluwer Academic Publishers at page 264 
33 For further information on this see A Review, by Kenneth Rogoff, Harvard University Prospect Magazine, August 20, 2014 
34 See F Hayek, “Competition as A Discovery Procedure” THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS VOL. 
5, NO. 3 (SUMMER 2002) page 10 
13 
 
In addressing more effectively, fiscal and monetary policy issues, there is need for greater focus on the                 
underlying basis of these issues which could be provided through greater research on micro economic theories                
and an appreciation of the answers which could be provided through greater exploration of these theories. 
 
 
 
 
D The Need For Supplementary and Enhanced Supplementary Leverage Ratios: Improving the           
Performance Measure Attributes of the Leverage Ratio 
 
Efforts Aimed at Reducing the Potential For Regulatory Capital Arbitrage Practices 
 
The leverage ratio can be defined as the capital measure divided by the exposure measure of a bank’s assets.                   
More specifically, the Basel III Leverage Ratio is defined as the Capital Measure (the numerator) divided by                 
the Exposure Measure (the denominator), with this ratio expressed as a percentage and with the basis of                 
calculation being the average of the three month-end leverage ratios over a quarter.  35
 
Components of the Exposure Measure 
 
A bank’s exposure measure is considered to be the sum of the following: 
 
- On balance sheet exposures 
- Derivative exposures 
- Securities Financing Transaction Exposures 
- Off balance sheet (OBS) items 
 
According to the most recent, updated Standard on leverage ratios (hereinafter referred to as “the Final                
Standard”), issued by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision in January 2014, the exposure measure               36
for the leverage ratio, should generally, follow the accounting value, subject to the following: 
 
● On-balance sheet, non derivative exposures are included in the exposure measure net of specific provisions or                
accounting valuation adjustments; 
● Netting of loans and deposits is NOT allowed. 
 
35 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Consultative Document Revised Basel III Leverage Ratio Framework and  
Disclosure Requirements at page 5 of 22 http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs251.pdf 
 
36 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, “Basel III Leverage Ratio Framework and Disclosure Requirements” January  
2014 Bank for International Settlements Publications, see paragraph 12. It is however contended that this version is a  
“near final version”. 
 
14 
As well as disallowing the “netting” of loans and deposits, the January 2014 final standard on leverage ratios,                  37
as issued by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, in compliance with the June revision, also provides                 
under paragraph 30 that, in order to capture the credit exposure to the underlying reference entity, in addition                  
to the prescribed CCR treatment for derivatives and related collateral, the effective notional amount referenced               
by a written credit derivative is to be included in the exposure measure.  
 
However, in contrast to its predecessor,  which highlighted under paragraph 27 that: 
 
- ​collateral received ​in connection with derivative contracts does not reduce the economic leverage inherent in a bank’s derivatives position. In                     
particular, the exposure arising from the contract underlying is not reduced. As such, collateral received (cash or non-cash) may not be netted                      
against derivatives exposures whether or not netting is permitted under the bank’s operative accounting or risk-based framework 
 
the Final Standard, paragraph 23 projects a more lenient and cautious tone in its approach to netting: 
 
- collateral received in connection with derivative contracts does not necessarily reduce the leverage inherent in a bank’s derivatives position,                   
which is generally the case if the settlement exposure arising from the underlying derivative contract is not reduced. As a general rule, collateral                       
received may not be netted against derivative exposures whether or not netting is permitted under the bank’s operative accounting or risk-based                     
framework. Hence, when calculating the exposure amount by applying paragraphs 19 to 21 above, a bank must not reduce the exposure amount                      
by any collateral received from the counterparty. 
 
 
Furthermore, extended provisions have been included to permit certain netting transactions between            
counterparties – to the extent that certain provisions and conditions stipulated in the Final Standard are met.  
 
As a means of ensuring consistency, comparability and accuracy in its calculations and measurements, the               
same coverage as that adopted for regulatory consolidation – as used within the risk-based capital framework,                
is applied by the Basel III leverage ratio framework.  
 
 
In contrast to many other jurisdictions, the U.S has introduced proposals aimed at enhancing the Basel III                 
leverage ratios, (the recently revised Supplementary Leverage ratios), as well as the Dodd Frank Leverage               
Ratio. Recommendations for enhanced leverage ratio requirements, “to apply to UK global systematically             38
important banks, and other major domestic UK banks and building societies”, have also been introduced by                
the Financial Policy Committe of the Bank of England.  39
 
Recent proposals aimed at enhancing the Basel III leverage ratios in the U.S would result in an increase to 5                    
percent of assets for parent companies and 6 percent for their banking subsidiaries under a proposal which will                  
37  Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, “Basel III Leverage Ratio Framework and Disclosure Requirements” January  
2014 Bank for International Settlements Publications 
 
38 “Dodd Frank section 165 compels foreign banks to comply with banking rules. Whereas eight of the largest U.S banks  
meet the 3% ratio, many foreign banks are permitted to meet the 4% ratio”. See S Skyrm, “New Regulation and the  
Repo Market: Leverage Ratios” http://scottskyrm.com/2014/03/new-regulation-and-the-repo-market-leverage-ratios/ 
 
39 See Shearman & Sterling LLP, “Enhanced Leverage Ratios for UK Financial Institutions” December 2014 at page 1  
http://www.shearman.com/~/media/Files/NewsInsights/Publications/2014/12/Enhanced-Leverage-Ratios-for-UK-Financial-In
stitutions-FIA-120114.pdf 
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affect the eight globally systemically important banks in the U.S. In November 2012, the FSB and BCBS                 
published a list of banks that meet the Basel Committee for Banking Supervision definition of a G-SIB based                  
on year-end 2011 data. The eight globally systemically important banks in the U.S, identified as G-SIBs by the                  
Financial Stability Board, are: Bank of America Corporation, The Bank of New York Mellon Corporation,               
Citigroup Inc., Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., JP Morgan Chase & Co., Morgan Stanley, State Street               
Corporation and Wells Fargo & Company.  40
 
 
 
 
The Issue of Calibration: The Risk Based Capital Framework and Basel III leverage Ratio 
 
The introduction of supplementary leverage ratios and enhanced supplementary leverage ratios in several             
jurisdictions, is attributed to reasons which relate to the growing realisation that the risk based capital adequacy                 
framework is not adequately calibrated with the Basel leverage framework, as well as the need to avoid                 
scenarios whereby undercapitalisation of banking institutions, as well as non financial institutions could occur. 
 
In addition to the issue of calibration between the risk based capital adequacy framework and the Basel                 
leverage framework, another potential source of undercapitalisation of financial and non financial institution             
relates to the use of credit conversion factors. 
 
The use of CCFs, as finalised by the Basel Committee’s January 2014 Final Standard, has been considered                 
inappropriate since it applies risk weighting factors to a non risk based leverage framework and further it is                  
argued, that the reduction of exposures through CCFs to as little as 10%, could result in the undercapitalisation                  
of banks. 
 
 
The Introduction of Supplementary and Enhanced Supplementary Leverage Ratios in the UK and             
the US 
 
Another justification and plausible explanation relating to why certain jurisdictions, such as the United              
Kingdom, may have considered the need to introduce supplementary ratios - may also be intrinsically linked to                 
the rationale provided by United States regulators to introduce not only supplementary leverage ratios, as               
regards the eight globally systemically important banks (G-SIBs), but also enhanced supplementary leverage             41
ratios - the need to avert possible undercapitalisation which could result to serious distortions within the                
financial system as a whole - given the systemic relevance of such banks. 
 
40 See Financial Stability Board, Update of Group of Global Systemically Important Banks (G-SIBs) (Nov. 1, 2012) 
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_121031ac.pdf 
 
41 ​The eight globally systemically important banks in the U.S, identified as G-SIBs by the Financial Stability Board, are: Bank                    
of America Corporation, The Bank of New York Mellon Corporation, Citigroup Inc., Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., JP Morgan                  
Chase & Co., Morgan Stanley, State Street Corporation and Wells Fargo & Company. See Financial Stability Board, Update                  
of Group of Global Systemically Important Banks (G-SIBs) (Nov. 1, 2012) 
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_121031ac.pdf 
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According to the Bank of England’s recent report on the Financial Policy Committee (FPC)’s Review of the                 
Basel Leverage Ratio,   42
 
- In order to maintain the relationship between the risk-weighted capital ratio and leverage ratio regimes,               
the FPC is requesting a direction power over a supplementary leverage ratio buffer for these               
systemically important firms. This power would also enable the FPC to advance its ‘too big to fail’                 
objective. 
 
 
 
The extent to which differences in Basel leverage ratio measurements persist, or the variations in the modes of                  
adoption and implementation, is not only reflected and evidential from several jurisdictions, which have              
introduced enhanced supplementary leverage ratios, but also within the EU, in relation to the Capital               
Requirements Directive/Regulation IV - where based on evidence from latest proposals and negotiations, as              43
well as the discussions which have been highlighted under this study, “EU member states will assume greater                 
independence in their ability to increase capital requirements”. The rationale and concerns resulting in the               
adoption of enhanced supplementary leverage ratios, as well as Binding Technical Standards, are             
well-founded. Further, even in jurisdictions where enhanced supplementary leverage ratios have not been             
introduced, concerns still linger over regulatory and accounting policy applications and implications. Disclosure             
measures, as well as enforcement measures aimed at facilitating improved consistency, comparability and             44
objectivity, however should serve to counter concerns relating to the extent to which such a performance                
measure should be relied upon. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
42 See Bank of England, “ Financial Policy Committee’s Review of the Leverage Ratio October 2014 at page 16 
“The Financial Policy Committee of the Bank of England issued recommendations for enhanced leverage ratio requirements                
to apply to UK global systematically important banks, and other major domestic UK banks and building societies.” See                  
Shearman & Sterling LLP, “Enhanced Leverage Ratios for UK Financial Institutions” December 2014 at page 1  
http://www.shearman.com/~/media/Files/NewsInsights/Publications/2014/12/Enhanced-Leverage-Ratios-for-UK-Financial-In
stitutions-FIA-120114.pdf 
43 See JP Morgan, 'Basel III Implementation: Is the Industry Running Out of Time?' 
http://www.jpmorgan.com/tss/General/Basel_III_implementation_Is_the_industry_running_out_of_time_/1320504512062 
44 See ​Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Basel III Leverage Framework and Disclosure Requirements, January 2014, 
Bank for International Settlements Publications) http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs270.pdf 
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E. Conclusion:  
 
 
As well as facilitating enhanced requirements for the quantity and quality of capital, serving as a basis for new                   
liquidity and leverage requirements, providing new rules for counterparty risk and new macro prudential              
standards, the CRD IV also introduces changes to rules on corporate governance (including remuneration), as               
well as introducing standardised EU regulatory reporting (COREP and FINREP).  45
 
Potential Basel III implementation issues for the Eurozone and European banks relate to increased cost of                
capital for banks, restrictions on distribution of earnings and dividends.  
 
However in relation to potential enforcement and compliance issues, the role assumed by the European               
Banking Authority, as well as tools being incorporated to ensure such enforcement and compliance, should               
serve to facilitate the implementation process - further improving convergence and harmonisation across the              
EU. 
 
The European Banking Authority (EBA) is now empowered to generate a number of Binding Technical               
Standards (BTS), guidelines, and reports for the implementation of the CRD IV package. 
 
- BTS are legal acts which specify particular aspects of an EU legislative text (Directive or Regulation)                
and aim to ensure that consistent harmonisation is achieved in specific areas.”  46
 
Guidelines are also illustrated by the EBA as being “important tools for fostering convergence of supervisory                
practices across the EU.” According to the EBA, although guidelines are not legally binding, supervisory               
authorities and institutions around Europe must make every effort to comply with them. Further the EBA adds                 
that supervisory authorities are particularly obliged to inform the EBA of their compliance or intention to                
comply with them and also to explain their reasons for eventual non compliance.  
 
Despite the merits of improved consistency and harmonisation in the implementation of Basel rules and               
regulations – such merits including enhanced facilitation of disclosure and transparency, a balance also needs to                
be struck between the need to avoid a „one size fits all“ situation whereby the needs of respective jurisdictions                   
are not met. 
 
 
The need to achieve more relevant and accurate results is evidenced by the evolution of the Basel capital                  
accords from the rather „crude“ original 1988 Capital Accord (which even though risk based, focussed               
exclusively on credit risk and did not apply risk weights in a specific and tailor made manner to asset classes)                    
to the adoption of more tailor made and specific internal ratings models. 
 
 
45 See KPMG, “CRD IV: Single Rule Book For EU Banking Regulation Changes and Implications” May 2013 at page 8 
46 European Banking Authority, Implementing Basel III Europe: CRD IV Package  
http://www.eba.europa.eu/regulation-and-policy/implementing-basel-iii-europe  
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Whilst comparability and consistency, which is sometimes attributed to simpler and cruder models, may be               
desired, it is also vital that results derived from such models reflect the reality and accuracy of prevailing                  
conditions – hence the need to provide for models which provide and generate credible results. 
 
As identified by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision in its discussion paper „The Regulatory               
Framework: Balancing Risk Sensitivity, Simplicity and Comparability,“ ​the disadvantages attributed to undue            47
complexity and reduced comparability in the capital framework, potentially“ include: 
 
 
- Increased difficulties for bank management in understanding the regulatory regime; 
- The challenges arising in capital planning; 
- Less accurate risk assessments; 
- The creation of regulatory gaps and opportunities for arbitrage; 
- An undermining of the ability of supervisors to effectively assess the capital adequacy of banks 
- Impediments presented to the effective review of the capital management process by supervisors. 
 
 
Empirical based research should serve to consolidate theoretical based research. However its limitations             
should also be acknowledged and hence it should assume such a complementary function where this is                
applicable and feasible. For instance, as highlighted by van Harten, given the inability of empirical research to                 48
demonstrate the presence or absence of actual bias, at systemic level, institutional safeguards should be in                
place or better still, consolidated. Within the context of leverage ratios, performance should therefore be               
measured, having due considerations to the need for calibration with the risk based capital adequacy               
framework, as well as the incorporation of thorough and frequent disclosure practices, as prescribed by               
standard setters, in order to ensure the facilitation of not just transparency, but also comparability, consistency                
and objectivity in relation to such a performance measure. 
 
In addressing more effectively, fiscal and monetary policy issues, as well as mitigate the limitations of empirical                 
based research, there is need for greater focus on the underlying basis of these issues which could be provided                   
through greater research on micro economic theories and an appreciation of the answers which could be                
provided through greater exploration of these theories. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
47 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Discussion Paper 'The Regulatory Framework: Balancing Risk Sensitivity,              
Simplicity and Comparability“ July 2013 Bank for International Settlements Publications 
 at page 12 
48 G Van Harten,  Contributions and Limitations of Empirical Research on Independence and Impartiality in International 
Investment Arbitration Oñati Socio-Legal Series, v. 1, n. 4 (2011) ISSN: 2079-5971  
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